toward" the Chinese who have made dtfficulties for theq1. Britain, too, .in common with the other European powers and Japan, toyed wi th the idea of dividing China up after the manner of Africa, and the Yangtse Basin was generally acknowledged as a Bri tish sphere of influence. The later policy of the United States, in the words of ·one of her statesmen, was "to seek a solution of the difficulties in China which might bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve China as a territorial and administratiye entity., protect all rights · guaran teed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, andsafeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." The reasons for this attitude are so obvious to every student of American history that I need not repeat them here. However, it is only fair to state on behalf of Britain that Lord Salisbury, then British Prime Minister, expressed himself "most emphatically as agreeing with the policy of the United States." " The relations of Britain with Japan on the other ·hand .' have for a number of reasons been entirely different. In the first place it was the Americans who .were responsible for forcing Japan to open her doors to the foreigner; secondly, Japanese leaders" were quick fo realize that they could not withstand the West save by adopting Western methods-which they did very rapidly; thirdly, having been Westernised-in externals at least-. Japan became the obvious ally for Britain in her opposition to Russian· expansion; and fourthly, Japan did not offer as attractive opportunities for exploitation as China. For these reasons it is easy to unders tand Bri tish pre-war policy toward Japan and China, and the situation in "the Far East generally.
The Great War, however, changed all that, as it did so many other things in in ternational relations, and it is ~ssentiaI to look at the post-war situation in the Far East.
In the first place, there is a very real difference of opinion between the Chinese and the other powers 'chl.iming rights in China as to the cha~acter of those rights. The Chinese feel that they are not in the best interests' of China and that they were acquired by force applied in an unfair manner. On this ' assumption the Chinese have' directed their efforts toward ending what they term the "unequal treaties"-and the "unfairly acquired rights'). As they are not in a position to gain their ends by direct force they ha' ve used diplomacy, the boycott, and the \ policy of "pin-,-pricks".-These methods have been used most effectively against, the British and Japanese, but all foreigners have suffered to some extent. The foreigners on the other hand rely on the validity of their claims in international law, even though they admit that their rights were acquired by force and 'without the consent of China. In the second place, the Great War proved so destructive to all concerned (victors, vanquished and neutrals) that the post-war world lqoked for other and less cos'tly methods of settling their difficulties. With this in mind they drew up in 1919 the Covenant of the -League of Nations, the relevant sections of which are given below.
The High Contracting Parties, In order to promote' international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security' by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations , between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings Qf international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governmen ts, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all 'treaty obligations iri' the dealings of orgartised peoples with one another, . Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 10
• The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve a{against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League: . In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by. which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
Article 11
1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to· the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace ot nations. ' In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
Article 12 1. The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will . submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resoi-t to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report of the Council.
2. In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.
Article 15 . 1. ' If there should arise between the Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is 110t submitted to arbi.tration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such sub-' mission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make aU necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. -2. For thi~ ' purpose the parties to the dispute will cOffiIl}unicate ' to the Secretary-General, as -promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.
3. The Council shall endeavour to effect, a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the·Council may deem appropriate.
4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the disp~te and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.
5. -Any Member of the League represented on the Council may mak-e public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.
6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies wi th the recommend a tions of the report.
7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, ' other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. ' 8. If the dispute between the parties is .claimed by one of them, and found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement .
. 9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the displ,lte to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the' dispute provided that such ~equest be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers ,of the CounCil shall 'apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those Members of the League, represented on the Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive ,in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, ' shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties, to the dispute.
Article 16
1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenant under Articles ' 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have' committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or :financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention , of all :financial~ com:", mercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals' of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. 2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the Members of the League' shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be' used to protect the covenants of the League. \ -3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will . mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenantbreaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Member~ of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants , of the League.
4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives 'Of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
As the United States was not a party to this, and as the Far East for reasons indicated above was in a very unsettled state, the Powers interested there in 192.2. drew up, signed and ratified The Nine Power Treaty, the main , provisions 'of which are as follows: '
Artisle.] The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:
, (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity ot China;
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China, to develop and maintain for herself an. effective and stable government;
'(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectuallY 'establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
. '(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.
Article'2
The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or, individually or collectively, with ' any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article 1.
As a further safeguard agains t the possi bili ties of war, practically all the Powers in the world, including the Uni ted States and Russia, in 192.8 agreed to the Kellogg-. Briand Peace Pact of Paris, which is as follows! .
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of th,eir respective peoples, that they~'condemnrecourse to war for the solution of international controversies;and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTq QUARTERLY
Article 2 , The High Contracting Parties agree that t' he settlement or" solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never , be sought except by pacific means.
In the third place, due to the development of nationalism and to the popularity of the principle of self-determination in China, and to a changed attitude among many in' Britaiti toward Imperialism, official British policy in China since the war has been directed, in themain, toward the creation of a friendly feeling between Britain and China, on the' assumption that a friend makes a better customer than ,an enemy. For this reason Great Britain has not only been a willing party to all of the ' trea ties providing for the maintenance of peace in the world and the satisfactory settlement , of the issues with China, but 1 has been willing to. surrend-er her Hunequal rights" 1n China as fast as conditions and the security of her nationals and their property seem to warrant. In the fourth place, with the temporary elimination of Russia as a great Imperialistic power and with the increased tension between Japan and the United States, the Anglo-Japanese treaty of mutual alliance no longer appeared either essential qr desirable and was allo~ed to lapse in 1911.
The recent crisis between Japan and China is the direct outcome of the problems stated above, i.e., Japan's special rights in China based on Treaties whi'ch were imposed by force, and the Chinese opposition to these rights and their continued attempts to end them and to force the Japanese to deal with China on terms of equality. The problem is complicated by the admittedly chaotic condition, social, econom, ic and political, of China, and the practical impossibility of finding anyone or any group able to assume responsibility for law and order in all parts of the country. Despite this, however, in view of the solemn obligations ,of both Japan and China, no attempt should have been made by either of ,those powers to enforce 'their own claims without first exploring the possibili ties of the League of Nations and the other means for preserving peace. I t is here that I take issue with Sir John-Simon and with the other apologists of British policy, or rather lack of policy. ' For while ~ agree that one of the important functions of the League is to serv.e as a mediating agent in the quarrels betw' een nations, its principal function, and 'the one which must be emphasised if it is to , endure, is that of preventing wars from breaking out. To suggest that the League stands for mediation alone is to admit that we are still where we . were iri 1914, for it was possible even then to provide for mediation either before or after war had broken out. While to suggest that we must wait for all individuals and na60ns to achieve a change of heart) or even to realize that wars do not pay, is, in the light of the last war, flirting with n~tional and international suicide. The defect in that pre-war society was the ease with which wars did break o~t, and the disastrous consequences , attendant upon them. ' , One: might as well suggest that the principal function of a fire department is to assess damages after a fire has occurred, or of a police department to decide wh~was in the wrong after a riot has broken ou t,as to agree with Sir John Simon and others of his opinion , about the function of the League. If we are ever to achieve an international society in which the burden of armaments ca'n' be lightened and some guarantee of permanent peace achieved, it does seem essential that we provide some security against attack and some assurance that wars may I~ not be waged whenever any group of irresponsible militarists feel like experimenting with their latest toys.
I t was in to .this field of international relations that the League of Nations brought a new idea and , a new "method. The idea may , be summed up in the word "co-operation", and the method in "joint action"~ and if there be no co-operation among the members' of the League to secure peace and no joint action after aggressive measures have been taken in defiance' of covenants, then the League would seem to have failed in achieving its main purpose, and it is unlikely that any degree of confidence' c~n' be placed in it in the future. The tragic thing about this conclusion is, as Sir Arthur Salter says, "that if the League fails now there is little ground for confidence that it will ever succeed . . . . in what other instance is it likely ' that those who are concerned would ' have so strong an inducement to support the colle<;:tiv, e system. I find it difficult to believe that if the collective system now fails, any country will retain confidence that it will be effective in another serious issue and if our present system fails, we can hardly hope to build again at least in our generation, for we have nothing to build with if the confidence in the observance of ertgagemen ts has , been destroyed." I t may be objected ' that no war has occurred in the Far East and that the ,League has been largely responsible for preventing war, but this objection is on the whole "eye.,.wash", based on legal quibbling. For if the facts are examined it is evident that an "unofficial" war has been raging there as a result of which Japan has gained her immediate ends (the permanence and control of her interests) in Manchuria aud shows little indication of any Intention to give them up. Her success in breaking the anti-Japanese boycott by her attack on Shanghai (which seems to have been the inain reason for that attack) is less apparent, but this lack of success has not been due to any action on the part of the members of the League, of the United States or ' of Russia, but rather to the unexpected and dogged resistance of the Chinese soldiers. The League, the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg...: Briand Pact have been unable to prevent losses in that city that ,are estimated at $400,000,000., 180,000 homes damaged, 8,000 civilians killed, some 10,000 civilians missing" and very heavy combataI?-t c' asualties.
Here it is interesting to' consider the 'attitude arid -action of Great Britain, the United States, Ru' ssia, and the League, together with the consequences apparent or ' probable to' all of them, including China and Japan,·-and all in terms of "enlightened self interest".. Britain's policy has been one of keeping the British peac' e at all costs, and doing nothing that would injure British trade by antagonising eith~r of the combatants. To this end she has shown a marked reluctance either to do anything of a positive nature herself or to co-operate with anyone else in doing anything, and her attitude can be pretty well summed up in Sir John Simon's "Peace and Trade", and in the Foreign Office Communique of January the ninth, in reply to the American proposals of a few , days earlier:
Jan. 9/32.-It was announced that the Government had decided not to follow the example of the U.S. Government in addr' essing a note to China and Japan regarding Manchuria, and the Foreign Office issued a communique reading: "His Majesty's Government stand by the policy of the open door for international trade in Manchuria .. ' : . since the recent events the Japanese representatives at the Council of the League at Geneva stated on October 13th that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Further, on December 28th the Japanese Prime Minister (since assassinated) stated that Japan would adhere to the open' door policy, and would welcome participation and co-operation in Manchurian ,enterprise. In view of these statements H.M.
Government have not considered it necessary to send any formal
Note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the ' American Government's Note, but. the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assurances from , his Gbvernment."
The United States has ' shown throughout a good deal more concern than has Britain, and her 'readiness to cooperate wi th the League, in the light of the history of the past ten years, is remarkable. Failing to get positive action on the part of the League, Mr. Stimson has on tWb occasi~ns clearly enunciated the American attitude; once in his Note of January 7th, to the governmen ts of Japan and China, and again in the letter explanatory of this note which he wrote to Senator, Borah, dated February 24th. 'The relevant sections of these are: (Note) . "The 'United States Government cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto, nor does it intend 'to recognise . ' any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments or their agents which impairs the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China. ,
The United Sltates Gove'rnment does not i~tend to recognise any situation or agreement which may be brought about by means coiltrary to the covenants of the Pact of Paris of August 27th 1928, to which both Japan and China as well as the United St_ates are' parties." Jan. 7th, 1932. Mr. Stims' on. \ (Letter). "The Nine Power Treaty forms the legal basis , uponwhich nqw, rests the Open-Door 'policy toward ' China." "At the time that this treaty was signed it was known that ChIna was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of 'a self-governing republic 'after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years , . of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The treaty was thus'a covenant, of self denial am9ng the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development'." .
Remembering that Japan had hinted that this Treaty needed revision" Mr. Stimson wen t on:
lilt must be, remembered that this Treaty was one of several , treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various Powers concerned, all of which were inter-related and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference aimed to promote the possibility ot peace. in the· world, not only through the cessation , of competition in naval armament but also. by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world particularly in 'the Far East. These problems were all inter-related. The willingness of the ' American Government to surrender its then, commanding lead in . battleship construction, and to leave its position at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortifications, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty, which assured the Nations of the world not only of an equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandisement of any Power at the expense of China. , One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating these provisions of the Nine Power Trea'ty without considering at the same time the other promises upo~ which they were really dependent."
The story of the part playe'd by the League in the struggle is too long to tell here. The Council, the Assembly, or Committees of the' Assembly; have been in almost constant session ever since the outbreak on the night of September 18th The policy of Russia throughout has been to avoid hos' tilities at all costs, for her leaders realize that a war with Japan would jeopardise the success of the communist experiment. While they would be reluctant to give up their interests in Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces of Sibe' ria and are re-enforcing their troops there, it is probable that they would not risk any major engagements East of Lake Baikal. In China the leaders of the Nationalist Goverriment realized from the outset that they were in no condi tion or position to oppose Japan by armed strength, so they ,placed themselves completely in the hands of the League and the United States. This brought so few results that the Chinese soldiers themselves seem to have taken the matter in hand, failed to wi thdra w froni' Shanghai as arranged (or so it is suggested) and defended that city and its environments with great courage and great loss.
Japanese policy' has been sometimes at cross purposes, due to the different attitu,des of the civilian and military ' THE CRISIS-IN THE FAR EAST sections of her Government, but in two matters there se~ms to have been fairly consistent agreement, one to seize and hold under some form of Japanese control the whole of Manchuria; the other, to cow and disorganize the Nationalist and radical groups in China proper by actual or threatened attacks oI). the vulnerab~e cities of China.
In the main, with the exception of China, all of the nations aforementioned have achieved their ends. But from these ends or from the methods adopted in achieving them have come dangers and consequences of a quite unexpected character.
In Japan the financial and economic si tuation, already serious, has grown worse, while the C01.1sequences of attempting to achieve her own ends by force, in place of , using constitutional methods, is reflected in the fate of her ' p' remiers and great financiers. I t is true that she has acquired Manchuria, but keeping it is -another matter, for that involves trying to govern thirty millions of Chinese against their will and against the will ' of the hundreds of millions of Chinese in the adjoining provinces. It increases the probability of hostilities with Russia a hundredfold and is almost certain to lead to an increase in armaments by the United States. The United States is so absorbed in its own domestic pro blems that no de' ar Cll t restil ts of the crisis in the Far East ,are yet visible. However, it has brought home . again to that country the futility and da!1gers of a policy of isolation, has caused her to co-operate to a surprising extent with the League of Nations, and, as suggested above, if Japan remains in Manchuria, is likely to increase American' fears of her, with resulting increases in armaments., The consequences to China have been. destruction and chaos. . The N a tiona]is t Governmen t is bu t a shadow of its former self, the Kuomintang is in the pillory, and destructive communism and banditry are rampant, while 'hatred of Japan and distrust of the League and the Western Powers have increased accordingly.
Sir John Simon has preserved ( t the British Peace" but has left Great Britain and the British Dominions heirs to , the practical certainty that on some other occ~sion when British security is more clearly involved, as it was in Belgium in 1914, Britain and the Do~inions cannot look to the League of Nations, or to the promises or covenants of other nations to, save her from-attack or assist her if attacked. They (the League, etc.) apparently will have done their duty if they are prepared to -n1ediate after the' even t. As for trade, despite the transi tory fillip resul ting .from droppin'g gold and from the boycott of Japanese goods by the Chinese, it is certain that the destruction " and chaos in China are not in the best interests of British trade.
Russia, as pointed out earlier, while alarmed, does not want to fight with Japan at -present. But the loss of her railways and interests in Northern Manchuria would be a serious blow to her prestige as well as a menace to her farther Siberian provinces. ' While -if war breaks ou tit will greatly delay her economic re-organization and may 'even wreck it altogether. For this reason there ate some grounds for believing that there are elements in other countries that are not adverse to the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia, in the hope that it might destroy them both, thus removing a double menace and leaving the "spoils" of Manchuria and the Ukraine to the onlookers. ' The part played .by the League in the whole affair has been a difficult and far from successful one. Its constitution prevents it from being more than the expression of the collective opinion and will of its,members, and as we have seen the opinions and will of those members in a position to be effective, were opposed to action. A great deal of concern was expressed by the smaller powers and for that matter by outstanding individuals in all couDtries, but they were not in a posi' tion to act themselves or to force others to act. The result has been generally bad; the Great Powers have seen that the League will not preve~ t them from forcing their demands on others; the , Small Powers realize that the League offers them no certain guarantee against attack; China has little, if any, faith left in it, while Japan has given its requests and suggestions the scantiest consideration when they did not coincide wi th her own desires. '
And what of Canada and her position in regard to it?
Most Canadians, despite the Great War, are still in a fog as to their position in, and responsibility for, international affairs; and this is reflected naturally enough in the at~itude of our government. We are a small power and a member of the League; and w.e h~ve for all intents andpurposes no armamen-ts, so naturally we are concerned in the success and failure of the League and its policy , of pooled security. On the other hand we are members of ,the British Commonwealth, and must consider our own position in the light of-that of the other Dominions, and particulariy of Great Britain. As Britain decided to do nothing we followed her lead. At the same time it must be remembered that Vancouver is nearer Tokio than London, and' Canada has immigration and race question$ to face which do not concern Great Britain. ' Thus it is .inevitable that the sentiment and policy of the United Stines toward Japan, and the failure of Great Britain to ' co-operate with her (the U.S.) in the Pacific, affect us, and may involve us in extremely difficult sit~ations.
As for trade, the fall in the value of silver, the dislocation of govern men t and industry in Chin"a, the boycott of Japan, and , the new Japanese tariffs, are not likely to improve the possibilities for trade with the Orient in the near "fut' ure.
I t may be, of course, that the League method and the post-war philosophy and policy of co-operation and jointaction have been bOl"n out of time, and that there is no real desire to see them replace the un tramelled ,action of states and governments in their dealings with one another.
But if this be true, and the readiness of all governments to license the export of arms to both Japan and China at 'a time when they were professing great ,concern at the outbreak of hostilities suggests that it is, then it is unlikely, in view of the destructive character of the w,eapons ' with which science provides us, that we shall be given another chance of creating an international society.
